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Abstract
Labor Market Flexibility (LMF) which is supported by the law of supply and demand are considered 
capable of creating an effi  cient labor market. As well as apprenticeship programs were considered 
to improve the quality of the labor force which can suppress the number of unemployed. Whether 
the application of LMF can be a positive impact like as imagined by its proponents? This is the 
result of research that seeks to see the dynamics of  industrial relations faced by the workforce 
under the LMF system and dismantle the neoliberal project of the apprenticeship system. The 
study was conducted during September-November 2016 in the industrial area of  Bekasi. The study 
used a descriptive qualitative approach. Collecting data through participatory research or live 
in. Searchable data sources using methods of a snowball eff ect. In the end, this study involved 
seven trade unions, six companies, two foundations labor brokers, three government agencies, 35 
workers (10 contract workers, 10 workers outsourcing, and 15 workers apprenticeship) and three 
labor activists. The result is the implementation of contract system and outsourcing many violate 
the rules. In the industrial area of  Bekasi composition fl exible workforce of more than 50% of the 
total workforce. And under the LMF system occurs bureaucratization in industrial relations. In 
addition, LMF policy does not reduce unemployment but only rotate unemployment.  and the 
apprenticeship system is expected to increase human resources in the labor force application only 
used by the owners of capital to get cheap labor.
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Introduction
This Paper seeks to provide a diff erent 
analysis of the lebor market fl exibility (LMF) 
policies. Its proponents assume that by 
implementing LMF will create a harmonious 
interaction labor markets based on market 
mechanisms. So that conditions can be the 
benefi t of the workers. Instead, the application 
of LMF actually poses a threat to workforce and 
the all workers. 
The dynamics of industrialization and 
labor system in Indonesia cannot be separated 
from global conditions. To analyze the issue of 
labor in a State cannot be separated from the 
global analysis. As Berquist discloses (Hadiz, 
1997, p. 7) if you want to see and analyze labor 
in a place cannot be separated from the analysis 
of the system (capitalism) of the world (World-
system Analysis). In the era of globalization, 
consumers have the freedom to the choice of 
goods in the market. The implication is that 
the companies are competing against the price 
of production so that the selling price can be 
reduced. the global capitalist wants production 
conditions to become more fl exible (fl exibility 
production process) to make it easier to respond 
to the market demand (aggregate demand). 
Frederic Deyo & Richard Donner (2001) 
describe the desired condition is “global buyers 
stress competitive price, good quality, quick 
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delivery time, and heightened responsiveness 
to changing demand requirements.” 
Juliawan (2010) explains that the incident 
cannot be separated from over production from 
global companies thus creating a competitive 
market. Companies are trying to cut production 
factors to create a large marginal revenue. 
The most easily manipulated production 
factor to create minimum cost is labor.  In the 
early 1980s aft er the Washington Consensus, 
neoliberalization was seen as a way to stabilize 
the world economy, preceded by America and 
Britain and then spread throughout the world. 
The agenda of labor market liberalization 
becomes the road, the embodiment is a fl exible 
labor market or bett er known as Labor Market 
Flexibility (LMF).
One of the goals of labor market 
liberalization in Indonesia since 2003 is the 
eff ort to create an ideal industrial relation like 
imagined of the liberal. Labor Market Flexibility 
(LMF) is the key to the idea (Caraway et al., 
2014). In the LMF, it is conceivable that workers 
are free to allocate their services to respond to 
turnover of relative wage change opportunities, 
while companies are free to adjust workers 
in response to turnover of relative profit 
opportunities. In the labor market, the free 
interaction between the employee and the 
employee is seen as a necessary condition 
for economic growth. The free labor user is 
looking for the workforce in accordance with 
the rational needs of the users, while the free 
workforce selects the labor users in accordance 
with the rational needs of the workforce (Purdy, 
1988, p. 5-6). 
In the above framework, collective 
b a r g a i n i n g  b y  t r a d e  u n i o n s ,  s t r i c t 
implementation of the rules of recruitment 
and dismissal of workers, severance pay, 
minimum wage and so on is considered a price 
distortion because it is considered to restrict 
freedom between employers and workers 
(Islam, 2000, p. 3-4). If the state intervenes too 
much in the labor market, the labor market 
is called too ‘rigid’ in contrast to the minimal 
‘fl exible’ labor market that plays the role of 
the state and surrenders market mechanisms 
as the prime mover of working conditions. 
Only with such a mechanism, an efficient 
job market can materialize. The argument is 
the basis of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) campaign to promote LMF policy in the 
world. IMF working paper (2012) mentions 
“that policies (read: labor market fl exible) that 
enhance labor market fl exibility should reduce 
unemployment”.
LMF is claimed to be a way to improve 
the economy of a country by reducing 
unemployment (Livingstone, 1998). Flexible 
working conditions are considered to reduce 
the number of unemployed because it can be 
absorbed by the contract system, outsourcing, 
and internships. Contract and outsourcing 
systems are considered capable of absorbing 
the workforce quickly because it is connected 
to the needs of the workforce. Much research 
has been undertaken to reinforce the need for 
fl exible labor policies that compare the number 
of unemployed before and aft er the policy is 
enacted (Hefeker, 2001; Lorenzo et al.,2012; 
Paul, 1994).
The apprenticeship system is considered 
capable of reducing unemployment because 
this system can improve the quality of the 
workforce. Productive age, which is a graduate 
from high school or equally, by following the 
internship program is expected to increase 
knowledge and skills. In essence, low labor 
education in Indonesia is claimed to be a factor 
of low productivity and causes the labor force 
not to be absorbed in the world of work. 
However, the liberal ideal of ideas is not 
easy to fi nd its manifestation in the fi eld. Studies 
conducted by Juliawan (2010), for example, the 
existence of LMF policy in Indonesia instead 
of making industrial relations become like the 
imagined of liberal, free and competitive, even 
led to the actors who dominate power over 
the workers. Both formal and informal actors 
134
Policy & Governance Review, Volume 2, Issue 2, May 2018
participate in the LMF economic chain. Taking 
a study in Tangerang and Medan, Juliawan 
explains convincingly that LMF policies are not 
like the liberal image that the labor market is 
following the market mechanism. But it turns 
out that the policy encounters its own paradox, 
generating an economic intermediary that even 
distorts the market mechanism.
It should be acknowledged that the 
Juliawan (2010) study contributes signifi cantly 
to providing an overview of established 
industrial relations following flexible labor 
market policies implemented, especially 
in the application of outsourcing systems. 
But the study has its own limitations. First, 
Juliawan has not yet recorded a massive new 
system used in the fl exible labor market policy 
of apprenticeship systems. Although the 
apprenticeship system is also contained in Law 
No. 13. 2003 but its massive use in early 2016. 
Friday 13 December 2016 Indonesian President 
Jokowi declared apprenticeship system at 
International Industrial Area City (KIIC) 
Karawang. Followed by Bekasi industrial 
area declaring apprenticeship program in 
April 2017. Secondly, Juliawan (2010) has not 
described in detail the LMF’s influence on 
the labor force. Is the LMF proven to work 
in accordance with the ideal imaginated of 
its proponent? Or even a threat to the labor 
force in Indonesia. Third, Juliawan’s studies 
in Medan and Tangerang in the 2009 medium 
missed the best momentum in the massive 
labor action in Indonesia that is oft en known as 
“grebek pabrik”. The “grebek pabrik” action took 
place in Bekasi industrial area where tens of 
thousands of workers took place in the medium 
of 2012 bringing the main issue of eliminating 
the contract and outsourcing system (LMF). So 
Bekasi became a lucrative laboratory to become 
a research area for key questions: (1) Can 
Labor Market Flexibility policy in Indonesia 
reduce unemployment? (2) How does Labor 
Market Flexibility policy aff ect the workforce 
in Indonesia?
Literature Review
Labor Market Flexibility 
In a recent debate devoted to The 
‘Labour Question’ in contemporary capitalism 
(Chhachhi, 2014), the sociologist Jan Breman 
and the labour historian Maroel Van der Linden 
(Bremen, 2014; Linden, 2014) in Bett i (2016, p. 
1) explicity addressed precarious work and 
its role in past and present capitalism. They 
explicity questioned the “standard employment 
relationship” as the norm of capitalism, while 
conceptualized precarity, informality and 
insecurity, no longer addressed as exceptions, 
as the real norm of global realitionship in the 
long run. 
The global convergence in labour 
relations is also one of the pillars of the analysis 
proposed by Sara Mosoetsa, Joel Stillermann 
and Chris Tilly (2016) in their introduction 
to a special issue devoted to precarious 
labour in global perspectives. The latter, 
thanks to a historical-sociological perspective, 
investigated forms of precarity in South Africa, 
India, Mexico, China, Italy, paying specific 
att ention to the intersection with the process 
of informalization and forms of informal 
work. Mosoetsa, Stillermann and Tilly not only 
conceptualize precarious work as the norm 
of capitalism, but interpret the recent spread 
of precarious work as a “return” after the 
interruption that had occurred during Fordism 
in several, but not all, countries. Like Neilson 
and Rossiter, they stressed that precarious work 
has had indeed a long existence in the Global 
South but in diff erent shapes and forms. 
Other recent historical research has 
shown the existence of forms of work, which 
today we label precarious, in diff erent phases 
of capitalism, questioning also from a long 
duré perspective the exceptionality of job 
precarity and its exclusive relationship with 
Post-Fordism and Neoliberalism (Van Der 
Linder, 2014). The perpetuation between the 
late-nineteenth and the mid-twentieth centuries 
of rather similar forms of precarious work, 
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in spite of the changes in the organisation of 
work and production, clearly emerges from the 
studies conducted by Sophie Beau (2004) on the 
department stores of Lyons or by Augusto De 
Benedett i on glove manufacturing in Naples 
(2006). In this perspective also lies the work 
of Marc Leleux (2015), who retraces forms of 
precarious work in the industrial development 
experienced by Northern France from the mid-
19th century to the early 20th century. Beyond 
Western countries and free wage labour, 
De Vito (2017) has conceptualized precarity 
in regard to late colonial and post-colonial 
Spanish America, looking at the degree of 
fl exibility and precariousness experienced by 
various kinds of unfree workers (i.e. convict 
labourers, chatt el slave). The most policy was 
implementated precarious working relations is 
a Labor Market Flexibility (LMF). 
Labor Market Flexibility policies are 
gaining popularity in Europe aft er the fordist 
era that guarantees labor (rigid). Job security 
such as labor law, welfare, and industrial 
relations is allegedly the basis of increasing 
unemployment in Europe (Barbieri, 2009). 
The economic downturn also scapegoats the 
rigid policy. The inability of the private sector 
to reduce the number of employees and the 
capacity of employees at a time when the 
European economy weakened because of the 
decline in oil prices at that time was considered 
to be the cause of the slow growth of the 
economy (Gilles, 1996; Grimsaw, 2003). 
 In Industrialized Countries (the US and 
Europe) the fl exible labor market agenda is a 
proposal of the OECD, the World Bank, and 
the IMF. Gerry Rodgers (2007) said that the 
three institutions suggest the deregulation of 
labor market policies to be fl exible in order to 
improve the investment climate. Rodges uses 
labor protection data (protection to labor) with 
the number of unemployed. The conclusion 
is the same as the study of World Bank and 
IMF that is the higher protection against 
workers making high unemployment rate. The 
emergence of outsourcing work system is one of 
the consequences of the specialization of work. 
With the specialization of work will facilitate 
the use of outsourcing work system because it 
looks the diff erence between the main business 
and supporting business (Mather, 2004). But 
problematic is the company can according to 
the will defi nes the main business and support.
The new economic orthodoxy — 
neoliberalism — emphasized a vision of 
effi  ciency delivered by self-regulating markets, 
with prices ensuring the correct al- location of 
resources. The role of the state was to maintain 
monetary and fi scal stability. In eff ect, this new 
orthodoxy replaced the Keynesian welfare 
state, which promoted full employment by 
stimulating demand in the decades after 
World War II. The new orthodoxy marked 
a structural transformation in labor market 
policy making in many parts of the world. 
States began to use macroeconomic policy, 
essentially monetary policies, to control 
inflation rather than to guarantee full 
employment, which was now relegated to 
the domain of microeconomic policy enacted 
through institutional and regulation reforms.
The new ap- proach provided a justifi cation for 
favoring “productivity” over “employment.” 
In the words of Jeffrey Harrod and Robert 
O’Brien, “it became legitimate to pro- mote 
unemployment to enhance productivity, to 
reduce the workforce to in- crease shareholder 
and executive salaries.” Indeed, labor security, 
which was held out as one of the main objectives 
of postwar development, was now seen as an 
obstacle to economic productivity and national 
competitiveness (Juliawan, 2010). 
In  today ’s  g loba l ized  economy, 
a combination of exogenous factors, i.e., 
transformed markets,  external market 
liberalization, and accelerating techno- logical 
change, also contribute to the pressures for 
flexibility. Many industries have generated 
global oversupply, creating what is called 
buyers’ markets. In such markets, customers 
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enjoy expanded choices and competitive 
markets. As Frederic Deyo and Richard Doner 
describe it, “global buyers stress competitive 
price, good quality, quick delivery time, 
and heightened responsiveness to changing 
demand requirements.” These factors put 
pressures on industries to make the supply side 
equally fl exible. In the developing world the 
pressures for cost and quality are transferred 
to local companies through the opening of 
ex- ternal markets. East Asia in particular has 
seen a rapid development in the direc- tion 
of opening their external markets. Many 
countries in the region have moved toward 
tariff  reductions as a condition of membership 
in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and 
participation in the Asean (Association of South 
East Asian Nations) free trade agreement. In 
export-oriented textile, clothing, and footwear 
industries, in particular, pressure builds on 
fi rms to respond quickly to the volatile demand 
for a wide range of products. And this requires 
relatively short production runs.
Labor market flexibility according to 
Rubery & Grimshaw (2003) is the ability to 
adapt and respond to change. Then Rodgers 
(2007) and Atkitson (1984) distinguishes the 
flexibility of the labor market into several 
dimensions. The fi rst, is employment protection, 
which is related to the work status of the 
worker, the variation of work type and the 
standard protection that follows. The point on 
the rigid labor policies necessarily permanent 
status. Second, wage fl exibility is freedom in 
determining the minimum wage of workers 
with the coordination of trade unions and 
employers. Here the workers have to fi ght with 
the owners of capital to determine the minimum 
wage. Third, Internal or Functional Flexibility, is 
a company’s ability to organize and reorganize 
the internal production processes and the labor 
used to improve productivity and effi  ciency. 
Examples are the fl exibility of working time, 
type of work, the skill required or technical 
changes. More detail is the fl exibility of the 
company to manage the production process 
becomes more effi  cient including the number 
of workers. Fourth, supply-side fl exibility is 
fl exibility in working even in family hours and 
vice versa. That is, there is “discretion” in using 
work time to meet the family, but vice versa, 
when needed at the company must be ready to 
leave family times. 
Labor Market Flexibility in Indonesia
Through Law No. 13/2003, industrial 
relations in Indonesia has become more 
fl exible. And they are three LMF mechanisms 
that will be the focus of this paper. First, the 
enactment of the Perjanjian Kerja Waktu Tertentu 
(PKWT). With PKWT, companies may hire 
contract laborers for certain types of work 
within a certain time. Broadly, agreements in 
a given time can also include laborers with 
monthly, weekly, and casual laborers in this 
category. Although indeed in some aspects 
have significant differences. In this paper, 
the object of analysis is the contract laborer 
or PKWT. In this mechanism, contract labor 
does not get the rights as a permanent worker 
so it relieves the burden of the entrepreneur 
(Tjandraningsih, Herawati, and Suhadmadi, 
2010). Second, the enactment of the outsourcing 
system. In this case, the company may submit 
part of the execution of work to other companies 
through employment contracts or the provision 
of services of workers/labor which is made 
in wrote. Third, the apprenticeship system. 
The internship system can be included in 
the LMF mechanism because it satisfies all 
four dimensions of the system. Basically, 
the apprenticeship system is used to get 
workers with a certain time. These three 
mechanisms represent the four dimensions 
of LMF mentioned by Atkinson (1984) and 
Rodgers (2007).  
The  impl ica t ion  o f  outsourc ing 
implementation is that many companies 
break the employment relationship with their 
workers to be further recruited back through 
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labor services companies (outsourcing workers) 
(Nugroho, 2016). Employers with the goal of 
effi  ciency feel safe if the workers who work for 
them are workers in a labor service company. 
With this mechanism, the one responsible for 
the outsourced laborer is a private employment 
agencies (Nugroho, 2018). In the opportunity 
provided by this new law, private employment 
agencies have sprung up to take advantage of 
unprotected workers.
It is wrong to imagine the operation of 
private employment agencies in Indonesia 
having similarities with their counterparts 
in the advanced capitalist countries. In the 
midst of still dominant patron-client politics 
where informal networks still play a crucial 
role (Nordholt, 2004; Sidel, 2004), including 
in economic affairs, the implementation of 
fl exible labor markets in Indonesia has specifi c 
characteristics. Private employment agencies 
oft en become more effi  cient (in their internal 
aff airs) when collaborating with networks of 
informal actors in recruitment and disciplining 
workers. In this connection, the term “informal 
actor” refers to two groups (Juliawan, 2010, 
p. 40). The fi rst group is a social organization 
based on religious identity and locality such 
as youth organizations, recitation groups 
and martial arts groups. Other informal actor 
groups are prominent individuals who play 
roles as religious leaders, village heads or 
RT heads and local strongmen (thugs). Both 
categories of informal actors gain strength 
from two diff erent, albeit interrelated sources. 
The fi rst source is a patronage  network that 
was treated since the Suharto era, namely 
the military, local bureaucrats, political party 
leaders, businessmen, criminals (gangsters), 
religious leaders and traditional leaders 
(Nordholt, 2004, p. 48). Other sources mainly 
deal with politics after the first democratic 
elections of 1999 and decentralization which 
gives greater opportunities for mafi a networks 
and local clans to accumulate power (Sidel, 
2004, p. 67). What is referred to as ‘local 
bosses’ by Sidel is contrary to the concept of 
patron client or ‘local strong man’ proposed 
by Migdal (1988). If Migdal believes that local 
strongmen are the main cause of capitalist 
accumulation in developing countries, Sidel 
with his comparative studies in the Philippines, 
Thailand and Indonesia shows that the network 
of local bosses “... has the capacity to facilitate 
and benefit from the expansion of market 
relations and the process of industrial growth 
in their respective areas of authority” (Sidel, 
2004, p. 53).
With the complexity and special character 
of Indonesia’s economic development, it is 
interesting to see the application of LMF in 
Indonesia. Broadly speaking, there are two 
LMF mechanisms that will be the focus of 
discussion in this paper. First, the contract 
work and outsourcing system. Second, the 
internship system. Both of these mechanisms 
have represented the four dimensions of 
the LMF mentioned by Atkinson (1984) and 
Rodgers (2007). The analysis will focus on 
how the fl exible work system is a threat to the 
workforce. As well as any LMF mechanism 
commonly found in the fi eld which is a threat 
to the workforce. 
Methods
Research conducted in this paper using 
a qualitative approach. To see how the LMF 
poses its own threat to the workforce, an in-
depth interview is conducted on LMF workers. 
What are the problems that oft en arise and how 
LMF impacts on the bargaining position of the 
workforce. In addition to seeing if LMF can 
reduce the unemployment rate then analyzed 
the related data. 
Data collection for this study combines 
a number of qualitative methods such as 
ethnography, participant observation, deep 
semi-structured interviews, group discussions, 
and policy studies. The object of research is 
actors concerned with the results of a search 
through the snowball technique. The result, 
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interviews were conducted on fl exible labor 
who work at these companies (PT HSJ, Trimitra, 
Tristar, Nanbu Plastics, Indofood, Bevanda 
Mustika, Mayora, PT Buana), Two Privat 
Employment Agency (LPK Mardizu and LPK 
Multi Prima Indoraya Bekasi Training Centre), 
Department of Manpower and Transmigration 
(Disnaker), DPRD of Bekasi, labor (10 contract 
labors, 10 internship labors, 5 permanent labors). 
(Danial Indrakusuma from Partai Perjuangan 
Rakyat, and activists from PEMBEBASAN), 
trade union officers (GSPB, SGBN, KASBI, 
F-SEDAR, SBBM, FSPMI, SPSI), 2 Bureaucrats 
from Disnaker District of Bekasi, and 2 staf ahli 
from DPRD from FSPMI.
Data were collected from September to 
November 2016. Researcher stays and spend 
a lot of time in Bekasi Industrial Area with 
the live-in way at the secretariat of the union 
and move to the flexible laborer’s houses. 
Researchers also are not uncommon attend 
the meetings conducted of labors, in the 
demonstration conducted by the unions, and 
in the confrontation events that occurred in 
the fi eld. 
Results and Discussion
Bureaucratization in the Industrial Relations
Bekas i  Dis t r i c t  inc luded  in  the 
administrative area of West Java Province. 
Bekasi District an area with the largest industrial 
area in Southeast Asia with a total number of 
the company; small until big companies added 
with UMKM 5908 (Data from Disnaker Kab. 
Bekasi 2014). If the company has taken only 
in small, medium and large scale without 
UMKM then the number 2,628 spread over 9 
Industrial areas. Industrial areas are spread 
over 4 diff erent districts. Nine industrial zones 
are I Jababeka Industrial Estate, Jababeka II, III 
Jababeka, MM2100, East Jakarta Industrial Park 
(EJIP), Kawasan Bekasi Fajar, Lippo Cikarang, 
BIEE and Delta Mas Industrial Area.
 According to data available at the 
Department of Manpower and Transmigration 
(Disnakertans of Bekasi District), in 2012 from 
9 Industrial areas in Bekasi there are 230,041 of 
laborers. From the data Disnakertrans of Bekasi 
District, the number of laborers with specifi c 
time employment agreement (contract labor) 
in 2016 reached 47,932 people. While for the 
number of outsourced labor, and internship 
there is no data until this day. The performance 
of Disnakertrans in recording and archiving is 
still bad. This is ironic because Disnakertrans 
are located in the largest industrial area in 
Southeast Asia.
To get the validity from the data of 
distribution the number of contract laborers, it 
can be seen from the offi  cial data of the Labour 
Union. Data from the Federation of Metal 
Workers Union (FSPMI) based in the branch 
of Bekasi, showed 91 large companies there is 
SPMI union. The number of these companies 
are the companies that there are SPMI union 
and have recorded the number of their contract 
laborers. The company that already recorded 
the number of their contract laborers only 91 
companies from a total of 313 companies in 
SPMI union. But from these data can be known 
how much the number of contract laborers, 
could even be said that the data released 
by Disnakertrans is too litt le and not valid. 
From the 91 companies with total 58,694 of 
their laborers consists of 28,564 laborers with 
contract status and 30,130 permanent laborers. 
Means that there are 48.6% laborers with 
contract labor system, almost equal numbers 
with permanent laborers.
From the number of contracts, laborers 
are nearly 50% of the total laborers in the 
industrial area of Bekasi can be concluded that 
the employers are trying to use laborers who 
are not permanent so it can be easily replaced 
with new productive laborers. Besides that, 
the control of employers for the laborers is 
becoming stronger. Because of the limited time 
employment contract, if the laborers do not 
obey the employer then it will not be extended 
its work. Evident from cases reported by the 
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laborers to Disnaker average of dealing with 
the unilateral layoff s undertaken by employers. 
Theoretically, the vulnerable job such as 
contracts laborers offered by Guy Standing 
(2011) called with the precariat, is the working 
class who are vulnerable and fragile in the sense 
of an uncertain future.
As disclosed by Abi (not his real name), 
a contract laborer at the packaging department 
in PT Indofood who was dismissed unilaterally 
by the company, there is no future guarantee 
for contract laborers. This happened because 
there is no specifi c regulation regarding the 
certainty of appointment from contract laborers 
into permanent workers. Abi said:
“There is no default sett ing about 
criteria such as what should be done 
so that contract laborers appointed 
as permanent workers. Though I 
during the contract period of two 
years is never one single time absent 
from work without explanation. 
Even sometimes when I was sick, 
I keep still working so that I rated 
well by my supervisor. But in fact 
when the contract period almost 
exhausted there is no appointed 
to become permanent employees. 
Whereas at the beginning I worked, 
my supervisor told me the important 
thing is work harder and never 
makes a mistake so will be appointed 
as permanent employees. But the 
reality was different, and many 
who suff er like me in this company. 
In Indofood itself, I know there 
are about 1,500 people are contract 
laborers.“
This fi ndings about the industrial relation 
of the outsourcing system is correspond to the 
study conducted by Juliawan regarding the 
private labor service provider who cooperated 
with the informal actors in recruiting labor. 
But the differentiation and focus of this 
writing are the outsourcing systems that make 
industrial relations becomes very bureaucratic. 
Bureaucratization occurred in industrial 
relations. The use of the term refers to the 
bureaucratic character that convoluted (red 
tape). Because occurs throwing-responsibility 
between the company-users service with the 
service provider if there are problems with 
the laborers. As stated by Henry, one of the 
outsourced workers in PT. X:
“I became a labor outsourced already 
9 years, whereas according to the 
rules of the law are not allowed 
and void legally I automatically 
become permanent workers. But 
when I reported to management 
then they told me to complain to the 
foundation. When I spoke with the 
chairman of the foundation, he said 
that it was my own business with 
the company. Well, then I was so 
confused where would to go.”
The Rise of Internship System that is 
Vulnerable to Violations
Since 2009 to November 2016 the 
domestic apprenticeship program has been 
attended by 169,317 thousand participants 
(Kemenakertrans, 2017). The details are 13,053 
apprentices in 2009, 14,006 apprentices in 2010, 
21,088 apprentices in 2011, 23,071 apprentices 
in 2012, 24,709 apprentices in 2013, 26,367 
apprentices in 2014, 26,437 interns in 2015 and 
20,586 interns by November 2016. As for the 
national apprenticeship program, which begins 
in 2017, it will be followed by approximately 
163,000 interns.
Bekasi Industrial Estate does not escape 
the “target” apprenticeship system, April 2017 
Minister of Manpower and Transmigration 
opened a national apprenticeship program. 
Noted, there are as many as 1019 students 
who graduate SMK / SMA who follow this 
program. From the raw data can be estimated 
that there are approximately 400,000 workers 
with apprentice status in Indonesia.
The basis of the legitimacy of the 
apprenticeship system is the education of the 
labor force in Indonesia is still low. So it takes 
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a container that can accommodate high school 
graduates to transition before entering the real 
world of work. Apprentice work is considered 
to be the ideal transitional place because the 
workforce can improve the quality and can 
adjust to the world of work. So with the training 
of the internship then the labor productivity is 
no longer low.
Promotion of the apprenticeship system 
has at least two objective bases, (i) to enable 
the workforce to compete globally and 
reduce unemployment, (ii) to bridge between 
graduate schools that do not yet have the skills 
appropriate to the company’s needs (see further 
Buechtemann, Schupp and Soloff  1994).
The apprenticeship system in Indonesia 
is regulated in Manpower Law No. 13/2003. 
How, according to Permenaker No. PER. 
22/MEN/IX/2009 apprentices should get a 
maximum of 25% theory and 75% minimal 
practice directly. Apprenticeship period of 1 
year working through integrated cooperation 
between work training institute (LPK) with the 
company where work. However, occurrences in 
the fi eld about the internship is much diff erent 
from that mandated by the Labor Law. From 
the fi rst day of internship laborers entering 
and working as normal as other workers. 
Almost all the internship laborers work extra 
hours (lembur). There is no job security or 
social security that obtained by the internship 
laborers. In interns in the regulations do not 
recognize salaries or wages, but the language 
used was the pocket money. The company is 
not obligated to hire internship laborers in 
accordance with the applicable UMK. And 
there is no minimum limit pocket money given 
to internship laborers. So in short, whatever 
pocket money given to interns during the 
participants do not mind, it is considered 
legally valid.
According to Saiful (the chairman of 
Trade Unions of PT Nanbu) explains that in the 
working factory there was a trend that wants to 
reproduce internship laborers. The fi rst month 
of enforced laborers internship in PT Nanbu 
began in January 2016 as many as 30 people. In 
October 2016 the number of internship laborers 
reached 50 people. After three times of the 
internship, the number increased (maximum 
three months). It means the company was in need 
of labor for that position. The apprenticeship 
process that occurs in the company turned 
out to be completely diff erent with the aim of 
apprenticeship in accordance with the mandate 
of the Law. From 50 internship laborers in PT 
Nanbu, began their fi rst day of work as other 
workers. No proportion of the introduction 
of 25% theory and practice. The internship 
laborers also allowed to work overtime. What 
distinguishes with other labor is on the salary 
and social security were not given.
Abuse of other apprenticeship rules in the 
fi eld is huge. Given the number of supervisors 
in the Manpower Offi  ce area will not be able to 
supervise the area with the number of factories 
that reach thousands. Apprenticeship rules 
violations or misuse that occurs industrial area 
of Bekasi, among others: 
First, the apprentice must get the theory 
and practice. But on its application on the fi rst 
day of the apprenticeship work like any other 
worker, it makes no diff erence. For example 
that has happened in PT NPI industrial area of 
Bekasi. The results of the interviews with some 
of the apprentice workers in the PT (20/10/2016) 
states from the fi rst day they work like other 
workers. The number of interns as many as 50 
people and alternately per three months. Labor 
becomes vulnerable because it has no guarantee 
of work security (Stunding, 2011).
Second, the apprenticeship period is a 
maximum of one year, but some cases show 
that interns can work beyond the specifi ed time 
limit and even participate in overtime. Overtime 
work is refi ned language became “Extra hours 
of apprenticeship.” As was the case in Karachi, 
reported by the media solidaritas.net (June 10th 
2016) PT Sankhosa Indonesia employ workers 
over a two-year apprenticeship.
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Third, this system generates actors who 
seek to benefi t from internships.2 Work Training 
Institution (LPK) which distributes labor for the 
company where work. As the testimony of KA 
(female, internship worker of PT NPI Bekasi) 
in solidaritas.net media, with the complicated 
mechanism, register through BKK School of 
SMK ITI and accepted in LPK MS but overall 
have to pay up to 1.3 million IDR.
Fourth, the established industrial relations 
became unclear. LPK which is the supplier 
and the company where the work can throw 
the responsibility if there is a problem for the 
intern. Normatively the apprenticeship is the 
responsibility of the LPK, but if there is a problem 
it can easily wash hands with the pretext that it 
is a matt er of the co..mpany where the work. 
The abuses described above are new in terms of 
normative and economical. In terms of political 
intern labor cannot be unionized because of short 
apprenticeship time and there is no certainty of 
work aft er the time is over. An apprentice also 
does not possess the power and bargaining 
position in the presence of the capital owner.
 From the various internships in Bekasi, 
we can see another crucial problem from the 
apprenticeship system which is the way for 
cheap labor. Apprentices do not recognize 
wages or salaries. The language used in 
purchasing apprentices labor is pocket money. 
By using “pocket money”, the workers seem 
to work voluntarily and the rewards earned 
depend on the goodness of the entrepreneur. 
The owner of capital is not obliged to comply 
with the minimum wage rules applicable to 
giving “pocket money” to apprentices. 
For example, PT Nanbu Plastic give 
pocket money to the internship laborers at 
2.144 million IDR, (example the slip of pocket 
money, see Figure 1), whereas the 2016’s UMK 
of Bekasi District 3,261,375 IDR. It means, with 
2 Actors who take advantage of the exploitation of workers 
are usually strong local people who have the infl uence 
to become a distributor of energy to the foundation. 
Further discussion of the actors sees Nordholt (2004).
the same productivity as permanent workers, 
the company could save 1,117,375, IDR -per-
month-per-laborers. If there are 50 internship 
laborers for a period of one year, then the 
company effi  ciently as much as 670,425,000 
IDR. Once fi nished one year (the maximum 
limit of internship) companies are looking by 
asking the LPK to fi nd a new internship laborer. 
Whereas laborers only get a piece of paper 
graduation certifi cate is not yet clear what its 
usefulness. And there is a contradiction with 
Law No. 13/2003 that every labor is entitled 
to get wages in accordance with UMK. The 
Disnaker of District of Bekasi understand it, 
but the rules are the regulations of the center 
so that the local government can not do much. 
“Yes indeed, the regulations of 
internship in fact used by the 
businessmen to  increase  the 
production more effi  cient in terms of 
cost. Whereas the purpose of ILO and 
the Government in implementing 
the internship program is to increase 
the capacity of secondary school 
graduates. Yes, we know what the 
entrepreneurs own character, so 
the good intentions of government 
misused. Such as an internship 
program to Japan, the internship 
laborers are paid every month with 
10,000,000 and they were happy 
with it. Whereas MSE in Japan 
nearly 50 million rupiahs per month. 
So, in fact, the entrepreneurs who 
received huge profits from the 
apprenticeship.”
From the pocket money slip above, it can 
be seen that the salary given is only 1,849,600 
IDR. This amount is far below the Bekasi 
minimum wages (UMK). The application of 
apprenticeship with this method only benefi ts 
the capitalist and harms the workers.
Labor Market Flexibility: Unemployment 
Circle 
The result of research in Bekasi industrial 
area shows that the ideal imagined of LMF 
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policy proponent is diffi  cult to fi nd in the fi eld. 
The picture that LMF can reduce the number of 
unemployed and can absorb labor is utopian. 
Because based on observations, fl exible labor 
policy of any kind then, in the end, will result 
in new unemployment. In the productive 
period, the laborer is contracted with a certain 
duration so that at a less productive age can be 
dismissed from his contract and replaced with 
new workers who are still at the productive age. 
Contract work system or PKWT in Law 
No. 13/2003 maximum applied 2 years and 
extended one year. So the count of labor is 
contracted a maximum of 3 years. However, 
the practice that occurred in the fi eld aft er 3 
years (the maximum number of contracts) 
workers were asked to re-register from the 
beginning. So that the period of work that has 
been run is not counted, so the company does 
not violate the Act even though it basically uses 
the contract system more than the specifi ed 
time limit. The practice is commonly known 
as “pemutihan”. Apprenticeship system also 
occurs similar practice. As revealed by Wawan 
in the fi rst sub-chapter, he and others become 
outsourced laborers for more than nine years. 
While other friends there are 6 to 7 years into 
workers whose status is outsourced workers. 
If it refers to the Manpower Act it should be 
void by law and become a permanent worker. 
Outsourced workers who have reached the 
maximum working limit will be transferred to 
another factory by the foundation. There are 
also those who keep working at the company 
but must register again to the foundation from 
scratch. That way the work time that has been 
passed is not counted and if the worker is laid 
off  then do not get severance in accordance with 
the actual working period.
In the apprenticeship system, there is 
a practice similar to the contract system as 
well as outsourcing. Workers of the internship 
system in accordance with Law No. 13/2003 
on employment requires that internship for a 
maximum of 1 year. If more than the provision 
then void by law and become permanent 
workers. But the practice that occurred in the 
fi eld is much diff erent. As experienced by Sari 
Figure 1. 
Sample Image of the Pocket Money Slip.
Source:  Slip of Pocket Money from Internship labor in PT Nanbu 
Plastic.
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(24) women from Pemalang. Promised by BLK 
in SMK originally worked in reputable PT in 
Bekasi industrial area, but Sari was deposited to 
the foundation of the work supplier. Then get a 
job with apprentice appointment for 3 months. 
With a 3-month apprenticeship, the company 
argues will train and see the performance of 
the concerned. Aft er 3 months Sari was not 
appointed as the permanent worker but not 
renewed internship at PT beginning. The 
foundation said that the company does not 
need workers, but there are other companies 
that need workers. Sari moved to another 
company with an apprenticeship contract for 
three months. Until this interview, Sari has 
moved to three companies. After the third 
company, Sari was never appointed permanent 
worker. In the end, since the apprenticeship 
time is up and the foundation says no other 
company needs an apprentice then Sari is 
forced to work as an informal laborer in a small 
coff ee shop around the Industrial area. 
LMF practices that occur in the field 
show no eff ort to absorb the workforce and 
reduce unemployment. But with the LMF just 
rotating the workforce. The LMF policy only 
forms a reserve circle of the workers’ army. 
There is a rolling between unemployment 
and temporary workers so that the number of 
surplus population is relatively maintained. 
Some cases indicate that aft er the apprenticeship 
period is over and not appointed as permanent 
workers, then the apprentices are then forced 
to become informal, or informal, laborers of 
the proletariat (Habibi, 2016), in the vicinity 
of industrial estates. The informal proletariat, 
if necessary, may at any time be withdrawn in 
the capitalist production chain. And the more 
intense the apprentice’s system is, the greater 
the position of the capital owners in union 
busting. If workers are divided by work status 
the working class will not be able to fi ght its 
interests as a group (Hadiz, 1997; Hadiz & 
Robinson, 2005; Tornquist, 2004; Juliawan, 
2011).
LMF impact on trade unions 
The application of LMF in Bekasi also had 
a negative impact on trade unions. Freedom 
of association is an illusion. Contract labor, 
outsourcing and apprenticeship policies make 
workers reluctant to associate. By looking at the 
data on the number of workers in association, 
comparing the number of workers and seeing 
how many contract workers in the Bekasi 
Industrial Area and comparing the number of 
fl exible workers who are unionized can fi nd out 
the detrimental eff ects of the LMF on the labor 
movement (Nugroho, 2016, p. 154).
In Bekasi industrial area, there are 5 
members of a large confederation (KSPI, KSPSI, 
SBSI, FPBI, KASBI) 2 a combination of trade 
unions, and more than 10 independent trade 
union workers. The largest number of labor 
unions is still held by SPSI with a total of 94,822 
members and then followed by SPMI with a 
total of 81,739 members representing the yellow 
union. The large red union is GSPB with 3000 
members and SGBN with the number of 500 
members. Only the KASBI Confederation with 
a small mass base in Bekasinya is only around 
300 members.
The decline in the number of members 
can be seen from one of the largest number 
of unions, FSPMI. In 2014 the total number 
of members from FSPMI reached 100,873 
members, while the data collected by FSPMI in 
September 2016 decreased to 81,739 members. 
In 2014 the number of Work Unit Leaders who 
became the basis of FSPMI totaled 432 factories. 
Whereas in 2016 the number of factories that 
became the basis of FSPMI only numbered 304 
reduced by more than 100 factories.
Trade union members who are fl exible 
workers from the data obtained from one of 
the FSPMI members, the Electric Electronics 
Workers Union as of September 2016, are no 
more than 30% of contract workers who are 
members of the union. Of the 95 PUKs that 
are the basis of the electronic and electrical 
sector FSPMI the number of contract workers 
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is 28,564 people. Whereas from the number of 
contract workers who joined the union as many 
as 8,190 people or only 28% of the total contract 
workers. There are not even outsourced 
workers joined as members. 
From the results of the study there is a 
large infl uence from the adoption of fl exible 
labor market policies on union density in the 
Bekasi industrial area. The infl uence of fl exible 
labor policies on freedom of association or the 
labor movement is:
1.  Diff erences in work status make workers 
fragmented and create sectoral ego.
2.  There is no guarantee of employment 
to make flexible workers unwilling to 
organize.
3.  The fl exible labor market makes workers 
trapped in economic behavior.
4.  Union busting practices against trade union 
offi  cials who are fl exible workers.
5.  Demoralization of fl exible workers.
Not all trade unions want to accept 
members from fl exible workers. Yellow labor 
unions with large members such as the SPSI 
do not want to accept contract or outsourced 
laborers as union members. SPMI still wants to 
accept union members from contract workers 
but not outsourced workers. Only the red 
union is willing to accept and fi ght for fl exible 
workers in earnest. That can be seen from 
members, advocacy and actions carried out by 
the union. Yellow labor unions in conducting 
advocacy and action tend to avoid the issue 
of contract labor and outsourcing. Advocacy 
carried out did not add to the problem of 
violations to contract workers or outsourced 
workers. SPMI and SPSI aft er the 2012 action 
have never again carried out advocacy and 
championed contract labor and outsourcing.
In the SPSI union, the number of members 
reached 94,822 out of 218 PUK / factories, none 
of which consisted of fl exible workers. This 
is because the SPSI does not accept contract 
workers as members. As said by Abi, a contract 
worker of PT Indofood, which is one of the 
large SPSI bases with 1572 members. Abi 
stated that when she had worked for 1 year she 
learned that there was a union at the factory, 
SPSI. When you want to register as a member, 
the SPSI management at the factory level does 
not allow contract workers to become members. 
One of the reasons for the management is that 
contract workers are not yet clear about the 
future of their work. If you have been registered 
as a member and next year the contract is not 
renewed, it will become a separate obstacle 
in the union. Therefore the union prioritizes 
workers to become union members. Contract 
workers feel discriminated against because of 
diff erences in status that are allowed to become 
members of the union. The impact of fl exible 
labor policies other than labor fragmentation 
above is the unwillingness of the workers 
themselves to organize. There is no guarantee 
that being appointed as a permanent worker 
after the contract ends makes the worker 
pursue the maximum target economically at 
the time of the contract. The average worker 
is contracted for 2 years and it is not clear 
whether aft er the contract ends the contract 
will be extended or not. This lack of clarity 
makes workers unwilling to organize. This was 
explained by the leader of the Bumi Humans 
PT Nanbu Plastic union, Saiful. Providing 
awareness of flexible workers about the 
importance of association is diffi  cult. Because 
contract workers and apprentices prefer to do 
overtime rather than associate. Even if there is a 
problem, the union is the place where workers 
complain and fi ght for their rights.
Flexible labor market policies from the 
description above cause freedom of association 
guaranteed by the Law to be of no use. There 
is a contradiction between Law No. 21/2000 
concerning freedom of association with fl exible 
work agreements in terms of association. Soft ly 
but very eff ectively makes workers away from 
the union. So the author uses the terminology 
of a Trojan horse or Trojan horse. Trojan horse 
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in Greek mythology is a strategy used to att ack 
the city of Troy. Att acking carrying a large horse 
statue in which was fi lled with soldiers. Aft er 
successfully entering the city of Troy the troops 
pretended to lose and retreat, but some horse 
statues had been left  in enemy territory. In the 
evening the soldiers inside the horse statue 
came out and viciously killed the Trojan city 
guards. Soldiers spread to the strategic joints 
of city defense and troops from outside came 
to help. Eventually the Trojan city was defeated 
by the Greek forces.
There are several important points from 
the results of the analysis of the dangerous 
system of flexible work on freedom of 
association. The damaging eff ects of a fl exible 
work system can be categorized into two, 
namely the stranglehold in terms of economics 
and in terms of politics.
1. From an economic standpoint:
a. The absence of a job guarantee makes 
fl exible laborers trapped in the mindset 
of economism. Limited work contracts 
make workers as money search engines. 
The goal is to be able to save aft er the 
work contract expires.
b. For outsourced workers, a work contract 
that is more fl exible makes them unable 
to associate.
c. Internship workers who have to pay 
to PEA from the beginning of work 
and work time is only 3 months, when 
working only oriented at least “return 
on investment.”
2. From a political standpoint:
a. Flexible labor market policies make 
fragmented workers divided into 
several strata according to work status.
b. Discrimination of the treatment of 
diff erent trade unions against fl exible 
workers.
c. Prone to union busting practices from 
companies that do not like union 
workers.
d. In outsourcing workers industrial 
relations become unclear.
e. The transfer of the company can occur 
at any time to outsourced workers so 
that they cannot associate in one factory.
f. Workers who work at a 3-month limited 
company make it diffi  cult to associate.
Conclusion
The ideal imaginations of the liberals 
proponent LMF policy seems difficult to 
find its application in the field. Instead of 
being the solution to lowering the number of 
unemployed, the LMF policy only roll-over 
unemployment. That is, LMF only rotates 
unemployment and does not reduce it. In 
addition, LMF further lowers the bargaining 
position of workers so that easily the owners 
of capital can dismiss unilaterally. Labor 
unions in Bekasi Industrial area experienced 
this. Flexible workers who are unionized are 
replaced by new workers. Workers under 
LMF become more precarious (Betti, 2016). 
The number of flexible workers who join 
the union is decreasing every year. Another 
threat from LMF is that it is a pretext of cheap 
wages, especially in the apprenticeship system. 
In addition, apprentices and other flexible 
workers do not get the right as permanent 
workers. The freedom of choice described by 
liberal theorists is only felt by capitalist, fl exible 
workers do not have the power to choose freely 
where they can allocate energy. LMF system 
also gained another (informal) actor who takes 
apart to pick up the exploitations of labor. 
Borrowing the Juliawan (2010) term “LMF is 
extracting labor from it owner”. This paper has 
limitations in capturing trade union struggles 
against LMF. Almost post Grebek Pabrik in 2012 
there was no adequate analysis related to labor 
resistance to LMF. This becomes an opportunity 
for further research so that it can mapping the 
workers’ struggle against specifi c problems, 
namely LMF. As well as there is no adequate 
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explanation regarding the configuration of 
capitalist relations with the network of informal 
actors in fl exible labor recruitment.
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